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ORBCOMM SATELLITES LAUNCH AND INITIAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS
David A. Steffy
Vice President/Program Manager, ORBCOMM Satellites
Orbital Sciences Corporation
Dulles, Virginia
Abstract
The ORBCOM:M: Flight Model (FM) 1&2 and
MicroLab I spacecraft were flawlessly launched by a
Pegasus® vehicle on April 3, 1995. Following
sequential separation from the Pegasus third stage,
the spacecraft deployed solar arrays and antenna
assemblies, autonomously de-tumbled, and acquired
sun-nadir attitude. Both ORBCOM:M: spacecraft
connected automatically with a Gateway Earth
Station (GES) about 8 hours after launch. Nominal
early passes focused on post-launch housekeeping
tasks. However, a series of anomalies developed:
including loss of gateway uplink, gateway downlink
transmitter oscillation, poor GPS position fixing,
subscriber downlink transmitter lock-up, and several
software problems. All these conditions were unique
to the space environment or resulted from minor
design changes or oversights. Eventually the
spacecraft were recovered from their outages and the
causes conclusively determined. Throughout this
time, the spacecraft housekeeping subsystems
continued to function nominally with a high degree

Figure 1. ORBCOMM System Diagram,

of autonomy. Following maneuvers and testing, the
satellites were delivered to ORBCOM:M: Global on
August 3, 1995.

Introduction and Satellite Description
The Orbital Communications (ORBCOMM)
satellite system offers non-voice, non-geostationary
(NVNG) digital messaging services between
remote or mobile users and customer locations
worldwide. As shown in Figure 1, these services
are provided via a constellation of small LEO
satellites that simultaneously connect the users
(called subscribers) to one of a number of gateway
earth stations (GESs).
The terrestrial network
completes the connection between the GESs and
the customer facilities. Satellite telemetry and
command uses the same network facilities to
connect the spacecraft to a central control center.
The ORBCOMM network automatically connects
the network through the appropriate GES to any
satellites in view. This connection may carry user

communications and/or spacecraft telemetry on the
backhaul TDMA downlinks to the GES. The GES
uplink carries outbound customer packets and
spacecraft
command
messages.
The
communications links to the remote/mobile
subscribers operate simultaneously and in the same
band as the gateway links.

yaw motion. Attitude control uses a combination
of magnetic torquers and weak gravity-gradient; a
magnetometer and two staring horizon sensors
determine attitude. The ACS propagates an orbit
ephemeris based on information from the on-board
GPS receiver; no other tracking is used.
For launch, the spacecraft simply stack on their
matching fittings atop the Pegasus or Taurus®
vehicle; each spacecraft can carry the weight and
bending moment of seven others. This allows
launch of an entire orbit plane with one vehicle.
Alternatively, other payloads may be mixed with
ORBCOMM spacecraft for polar or replenishment
missions. The 1995 mission (Figure 3) launched
ORBCOMM FM1&2 with MicroLab I, another
MicroStar spacecraft derived from the ORBCOMM
design.

Immediately following the 1995 initial launch, the
network consisted of the PM 1&2 satellites, three
GES sites in the U.S. (including a dual site in
Arizona) and the central network and satellite
control center. A fourth U.S. GES and other
upgrades have since come on-line as part of the
transition to commercial service.
Each ORBCOMM satellite (Figure 2) consists of
an aluminum-beryllium honeycomb ring and single
equipment shelf holding the avionics, batteries, and
cold-gas propulsion system. The antenna assembly
(which also contains the magnetometer and gravitygradient mass) folds in four pieces for stowage
across the center of the equipment bay. Two ultrathin solar arrays fold 90° from their zenith position
to stow against the equipment shelf and across the
"top" of the spacecraft body. Following launch, the
deployed arrays are positioned in elevation by a
single-axis drive and in azimuth by the spacecraft's

The spacecraft's avionics (Figure 4) comprise three
serial busses radiating from a central flight
computer.
This computer handles telemetry,
command, message storage and other message
routing functions, and hosts the master health and
maintenance (H&M) task. The first serial bus
connects to the attitude control electronics (ACE)
which autonomously runs all ACS functions and
software, and the battery charge regulator (BCR).

GPS Antenna (4)
Battery
Antenna Stowage Trough

Antenna Base Hinge

Magnetometer

Solar Cells
Thruster (2)

Figure 2. Satellite Deployed Configuration.
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Launch Site Ooerations
The FMl&2 satellites shipped to the Vandenburg
AFB launch integration site on the evening of
March 2, 1995. The antenna assemblies and solar
arrays were transported separately from the
spacecraft bodies to minimize the stowage time of
the densely-packed fiberglass/copper antenna
elements. Upon arrival, the spacecraft immediately
began a brief final test and integration flow (Figure
5), First, batteries were reconditioned, calibrated
and charged. Abbreviated systems tests followed.
Then the antennas were installed. Following RF
communications checks, the solar arrays were
installed and the electrical connections to the
spacecraft confirmed. Connections from the arraymounted GPS antennas to the receiver were also
verified. Then the antennas were carefully folded
and packed in the narrow stowage trough.
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The launch site operations were designed to hold
the maximum antenna stowage time to about two
weeks. Though no long-term deleterious stowage
effects had been found, tests had shown that the
antenna elements took a short-term "set" while in
the tight confines of the trough. Therefore the
stowage time was taken as a soft launch constraint.
Following antenna stowage, the arrays were folded
and attached to their redundant non-explosive
deployment release. Then the two spacecraft were
stacked in a horizontal position. A single lift and
rollover operation mated the pair of spacecraft to
the top of MicroLab I (Figure 6), which had just
completed similar preparations and was already
mated to Pegasus.
The standard Pegasus
integration and test flow was to prepare the vehicle
and confirm the payload interfaces.

I

Figure 3. Pegasus Launch Configuration.

The BCR is the heart of the peak-power-tracking
power system and includes a main bus/battery
charge 11-17 volt regulator, central 5-volt
regulator, and an additional 5-volt "phoenix"
regulator that powers the BCR itself. The second
serial bus connects to the gateway transceiver,
which handles up- and downlinks to the GES. The
third bus connects the computer to the dual
subscriber (downlink) transmitter (STX) , and the
seven-channel subscriber (uplink) receiver (SRX).
An additional UHF beacon is also provided. Each
unit contains a 68302
major aVIOnICS
microprocessor. A slave processor in the flight
computer provides additional serial links for the
launch vehicle interface and test port.

Launch site operations proceeded quite smoothly.
Only two minor integration problems occurred: a
minor software bug in the customized Pegasus
telemetry initially caused communications problems.
More seriously, the zero-force separation connector
used between MicroLab and FM2 failed to fully
engage after the spacecraft were mated. This forced
the spacecraft to be demated, the connector adjusted,
and the mate operation repeated. The connector has
been relocated on future spacecraft to improve
access in the launch configuration.

Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) builds and
launches the satellites under contract to
ORBCOMM Global, L.P. ORBCOMM is an
equity parnership of OSC and Teleglobe, Inc. OSC
also provided the satellite control center and
operated the satellites during initial operations and
testing.

Battery enable plugs were installed prior to fairing
installation. This turned on the spacecraft's 5-volt
bus and forced continuous trickle-charge and
spacecraft telemetry monitoring during the final
days of Pegasus preparations. This condition also
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Subscriber Bus Subscriber
Transmitter
To Pegasus

Antennas

Umbilical Bus

PowerlPyro

.--.1-_-..l...., Gateway ......-_ _---,
Avionics
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Computer

Bus

GPS
UHF
Transmitter

14V

Power

I-~I

5V Power

Sensors
Torquers
Solar Array
Figure 4. Avionics System Diagram..

required a mobile power supply during rollout from
the integration facility to the flight line. Future
Pegasus missions will permit installation of the
plugs on the flight line to simplify payload
operations.

approximately two weeks. Launch preparations
and countdown conveniently occurred during the
normal working day.
All spacecraft telemetry during the aborted attempt
was nominal. As expected, the spacecraft gradually
cooled at altitude, and the lower battery
temperatures increased their capacities.
This
resulted in additional trickle and topoff charging
from the power supply on the aircraft. Landing
loads on the return to base were not a concern.

Launch. Deployment, and Initial Contact
During final pre-launch operations, some key
personnel were able to return to Virginia to support
initial operations. Launch control room staff
consisted of the vehicle engineers for the
development, FM!. and FM2 spacecraft, the I&T
manager, the program manager, and an
ORBCOMM Global representative.
Additional
launch site personnel supported electrical and
mechanical operations, flight assurance, etc.
Spacecraft telemetry during launch was simple; the
number of personnel was set to have expertise
available in an anomaly.

However, the time required to remove and repair
the fairing exceeded the two-week antenna stowage
limit. Based on our recent experience handling the
antennas and spacecraft, we decided that demating
the spacecraft and subjecting the antenna assembly
to another stowage cycle posed greater risk that the
stowage effects. No asymmetric patterns or other
side effect have been detected on orbit. However,
this event highlighted the need to design a more
"comfortable" antenna stowage and guarantee
stowage times well beyond that needed for a
nominal processing cycle.

Launch was scheduled for March 17 but fog
prevented Pegasus carrier aircraft takeoff.
A
second attempt the following afternoon was aborted
during captive carry flight when thermal protection
material debonded from the Pegasus fairing. Both
of these attempts had been scheduled for a late
afternoon launch, resulting in daylight aircraft
operations and an initial orbit with no eclipses for

The time to repair the fairing forced a switch to an
early morning launch window to maintain the initial
sunlit orbits. In addition to the annoyance of
forcing early morning countdown operations, this
placed the best daily series of passes in the late
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Figure 5. Launch Site Flow.

evening and overnight on the U.S. east coast during
the first several weeks of operations. This was to
later have a serious effect on team fatigue during
troubleshooting.

flawlessly. In addition, all the spacecraft's power
systems, thermal control, and other subsystems
were behaving nominally. And, best of all for the
communications mission, this telemetry had been
received on a 3° elevation pass.

On April 3, 1995, Pegasus launched successfully
into an excellent 741 x 759 km orbit, inclined
70.03°. (Target was 739 x 743 km.). Telemetry
via the Pegasus link indicated that the grazing solar
incidence on FMl's top panel began charging the
batteries following fairing separation. Separations
occurred at nominal times and attitudes according
to the sequence shown in Figure 7.

Operations on the next four passes consisted of
dumping "back-orbif' telemetry stored since
launch, loading initial stored commands, and
continuing to verify initial spacecraft operation.
Launch telemetry also confirmed that deployments
had been nominal; the spacecraft's all-new array
and antenna systems had worked as intended. All
passes were fully staffed at this time. Meanwhile,
the launch team slept and began to return east.
ORBCOMM personnel began to evaluate the
communications system, taking spectral scans of
the uplink band using the SRX. This was a high
priority mission because the level and nature of
interference in the band is important to the system's
operations.

The Arcade, New York GES successfully
connected to both spacecraft approximately 8 hours
after launch. Both spacecraft had autonomously
acquired an upright attitude and killed residual
tipoff rates from separation. One was already in
ACS nadir-yaw mode. This is the best, and
nominal operating, mode of the ACS where it both
points the antenna at nadir and tracks the sun in
yaw. The FM2 spacecraft was in "safe-hold"
mode, where the attitude estimator is using horizon
sensor data, but the yaw steering has not yet been
initiated. Both these conditions indicated low
tipoff rates, excellent ACS performance, or both.
And one of the significant technical risks-autonomous ACS mode-switching--had worked

Anomalies and Recovery
On the sixth pass, FM2 failed to connect to the
GES. FMl connected normally to the same GES,
seeming to rule out GES or network problems.
This was the first of several. at times interlocking,
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Figure 6. Integration.

flight computer for routing by a network packet
management task. This task also generates a return
message that replies to the GES's attempted
connection. That message passes to the gateway
transceiver's 68302, which sends it to the transmit
DSP for modulation. When received at the GES,
the observed downiink frequency error is used to
refine the uplink doppler pre-correction.
Successful completion of the full exchange is called
a "connection" and enables the flow of up and
downlink commands, telemetry, and message
traffic. Therefore such a connection uses the
transceiver's RF functions, both nsps, and the
68302 processors in both the transceiver and the
flight computer.

anomalies that clouded the early days of the
ORBCOMM mission (Table 1). Though the table
summarizes the most probable causes, the
anomalies were resolved with a combination of
traditional fault-tree approaches, testing on qual
and engineering model hardware, analysis,
creativity, and luck.
A good GES connection relies on proper GES
software and modem configuration, working RF
transmit and receive sections in the spacecraft
transceiver, digital signal processing of the
received uplink, and enough baseband processing
to process the incoming messages and respond.
The network commands the appropriate GES to
send messages that begin the connection protocol
when a spacecraft comes into view.
The
transmission occurs on the nominal uplink
frequency but is pre-corrected for the anticipated
doppler effect.
The spacecraft's gateway
transceiver is tuned to the nominal receive
frequency, and has an effective frequency offset
capability of less than 400 Hz. The tranceiver's
DSP-based demodulator constantly attempts to
extract valid bits from the incoming signal and look
for a packet preamble. The receiver DSP then
demodulates the rest of the packet and passes it to
the transceiver's 68302. It is then forwarded to the

Two simplified links also exist. The first, which
originated as a test mode, bypasses certain network
software. This approach, though reducing the
amount of software required, does not guarantee
delivery of packets like the full 'connect' protocol.
The second provides a means for the gateway
transceiver to reset all spacecraft microprocessors
and reload the nsp code and parameter images in
all the RF units. This master reset requires certain
transcei ver functions, but eliminates most of the
other spacecraft hardware and software. FMl&2
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Figure 7. Launch Sequence Diagram.

Table 1 Master Table of Anomalies
Anomaly
Cause
FM2 Uplink Loss
Upset in GWRX DSP Resets Disabled

FM1 Subscriber Bus
Communications

Probable PROM SEL

FM2 Gateway Oscillation

Coupling of STX Signal into Last HPA
Stage When Undriven
Interaction Between Variable Antenna
Geometry and Satellite Tracking Algorithm
See Bug List

Poor GPS Fixing
Miscellaneous Software Bugs

both respond
command.

to

the identical

master reset

Constellation Change
Improved ResetiWatchdog Strategy;
Improved OPt)
Replaced PROMs; Additional
Screening for SEE; Improved Bus
Protocol
Change Matching Circuit Between HPA
Staaes; Additional Testina/Analysis
Use Fixed GPS Antenna; Correct
Receiver Software Bugs
Incorporate Known Fixes

the transmitter and receiver, uplink signal strengths,
etc. Commands sent in the test mode described
above failed operate any function that could be
observed in telemetry. Nor did commanded resets
of the gateway transceiver processor cure the
problem. Later tests would show that no uplink
packets had even reached the gateway transceiver's
68302 processor. The spacecraft was likely to be
lost unless the gateway transceiver could be reset or
the master reset activated.

Early in the nusslon, the spacecraft used a
broadcast telemetry mode so that telemetry was
available even if they did not connect to a. GES.
Thus, basic FM2 telemetry was available despite its
failure to connect. However, in addition to its
failure to connect, FM2 stopped sending telemetry
from its gateway transceiver. This prevented
analysis of software status, tuning frequencies of
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and quirks in software operation triggered by
unforseen side-effects of the actual SRX received
spectrum contributed to the confusion.

The situation of a non-responsive unit had been
forseen in the software design and mission plan.
Each unit's 68302 processor is polled by a health
and maintenance software task on the flight
computer. Units that fail to respond are normally
automatically reset. However, late in the program.
such automatic resets were disabled due to
concerns about their effect during captive carry and
launch. They had not yet been re-enabled when
FM2 failed.
This polVresponse system only
guarantees basic functioning of the 68302; it does
not ensure properly operating task or operation of
the DSPs in the SRX and gateway transceiver.
This approach is being upgraded for FM3-36.

The anomaly disrupted the operations plan, which
had assumed a measured pace of testing over three
months while the spacecraft drifted to their
positions..
Rather than the two operators.
operations director, and supporting engineering
planned, teams of engineers were added to the
control center and pass planning to conduct the inorbit recovery attempts. These engineers and
others also conducted lab tests at other times of the
day. People gathered outside the glass-walled
control waiting for the latest news following a pass.
Management and the program team were under
extreme pressure due to the program's visibility,
importance to both ORBCOMM and OSC, and
self-imposed dedication. The spacecraft team,
already tired from the pre-launch schedule,
attempted to adjust to working midnight passes on
Efficiency and morale
top of a day job.
correspondingly suffered: crisp debugging skills
eluded a team that recently had solved many
obscure development problems quickly.

Therefore, stored command "watchdogs" to reset
certain units on timeout were also planned. In
particular, one such command will reset the
gateway transceiver. This reinitializes its DSP and
reloads all the parameters and software necessary
for demodulation of the gateway uplink. However,
these commands were not yet loaded into the
spacecraft.
That left only the master reset (fuecode)
commands. However, this early in the mission, the
two spacecraft had separated by only a small orbital
arc. Thus, a fuecode sent to FM2 would also affect
FMl. With the future of the ORBCOMM project
vested in FMl, we were extremely reluctant to
completely reset it in an attempt to recover FM2.
After about lO days, limited resets were attempted
while FMl was below the GES horizon. However,
these had the disadvantage of poor elevation angle,
multipath, and time limits on the attempts.
Gradually, the attempts moved higher in elevation
as the spacecraft separated. The uplink was swept
in frequency and various possible flaws in the
modulation were countered. All attempts failed.

Subscriber Bus Anomaly
Approximately 12 days after launch, telemetry
ceased from FM l' s STX and SRX.
Reset
commands to the units failed. The transmitter also
failed to respond to observable frequency
assignment commands. Cycling the l4-volt bus
power at the BCR also had no effect. Again, fault
tree, telemetry/timeline, and other classic analyses
were employed to track down the problem. The
primary clue was subtle changes in the SRX current
consumption around the reset and power cycling
events, as well as during the original anomaly.

Both simple and exhaustive fault tree analyses were
completed. However, the successful operation after
launch, FM 1's use of the same GES and network
assets and software, and lab testing on the
qualification spacecraft eliminated most of the
hypothesized failures. Those remaining included a
sudden hardware failure in the gateway receiver,
antenna, or reset circuitry; a mis-tuned receive
synthesizer; or a receive DSP software fault, singleevent upset, or latchup. Poor doppler correction on
the "open-loop" uplink also could not be eliminated
by ground testing, and FM 1 had experienced a
number of minor difficulties with other dirty-pipe
commands. Other minor software bugs affecting
PMl, the additional anomalies described below,

The flight computer, STX, and SRX communicate
on a physical bus that behaves, for telemetry,
command and packet data, as a token ring. The
flight computer generates a token message, appends
its command or data messages, and sends them to
the STX. The STX then can talk on the bus for a
limited period before passing the token to the SRX,
which in tum returns it to the flight computer.
However, some of the network software in the
flight computer commands SRX uplink channel
modes directly, bypassing this token protocol.
Following a reset, SRX current draw first increases
as one channel's DSP begins normal operation.
However, a second small current increase could be
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seen-possibly DSPs on the other channels being
commanded into their operating modes from idle.

Though the receiver software was tested in an
orbital mode, the vendor did not fully understand
the geometry effect. Conversely, the subtleties of
the tracking algorithm were only fully understood
by Trimble; spacecraft testing focused merely on
the number of visible SVs. The ORBCOMM
satellites now under construction feature bodymounted GPS antennas to avoid the varying
geometry. (The array mounting on FM 1&2 was a
GPS
attitude
leftover
from
attempted
determination, which did not work.)
These
spacecraft also use a more advanced Rockwell
receiver. Finally, OSC has upgraded its GPS
testing capability to allow full combined orbital and
geometric signal simulation.

Lab tests confIrmed the current levels corresponded
to this normal behavior. A small software patch
was developed and tested to route the token in
reverse-to the SRX fIrst. Uploading of this patch
restored the SRX telemetry, confIrming that the
STX was losing the token. Likely faults remained a
hardware failure or digital circuitry latchup. Lab
tests also showed a sneak path from an unswitched
14 volt line that might have prevented complete
removal of the 5-volt supply during a reset.

GPS Anomaly
Throughout the early operations the Trimble
Navigation GPS receivers on both spacecraft would
sometimes fail to provide navigation fIxes for an
extended time.
During outages, the ACS
propagates the emphemeris for its own use, but this
propagated state degrades without periodic updates.
Extensi ve testing showed that the outages could
sometimes be ended by resetting the receiver. The
exact behavior depended, but was not fully
explained by, the combination of "hard" (reset line
strobing) and "soft" (software commanded) resets
used. Loading the GPS with a new emphemeris
also helped.
Additionally, on-orbit data also
indicated a correllation with certain geometries and
solar array steering modes.

Recovery
The GPS problem also existed on FM2, but it could
not be reset or loaded with new emphemerides.
The on-board ephemeris gradually diverged from
the actual one until an occasional GPS fIx would
correct it. When this divergence became great
enough, the ACS yaw steering degraded.
Eventually, solar array pointing became poor
enough that deep battery cycles were needed to
support the modest power loads on some orbits.
The ORBCOMM spacecraft are specifIcally
designed to recover from a zero-power condition.
This power-system feature, known as Phoenix
mode, was tested extensively during development.
Lacking any battery power, it fIrst powers the BCR
electronics from any solar array output there is.
Additional power is crammed into the batteries at
whatever rate is available, and essential loads are
restored as the state of charge reaches
predetermined levels. When nearly full panel
output is available, this recovery can take less than
half a daylight period on a single orbit.

While the GPS software accounts for GPS SVs
being masked by the earth, it does not account for
the additional blockage by the spacecraft as the
solar arrays rotate. When the array-mounted GPS
antennas tilt relative to local horizontal, SVs above
the horizon can be obscured by the arrays. Even
though enough other SVs are available, the receiver
continues to track occulted SVs that are above the
horizon through their signal "outage". If more than
two receiver channels are misallocated in this
manner, the receiver cannot fix.
Resets and
emphemeris loads cause the receiver to look for
new SVs that are currently showing adequate
signals.

On the morning of May 13, FM2 automatically
connected to a GES. A telemetry dump indicated
that the power system had passed through Phoenix
mode and all avionics had reset.
Watchdog
commands were loaded and health and maintenance
automatic resets enabled. Testing indicated no
other hardware degradation. FM2 was back!

A simple test confIrmed this theory. The solar
arrays were commanded to a horizontal position
and held there, so the GPS antennas faced zenith.
The receiver was reset, and tracked SVs properly.
A variant of this geometry-reset strategy provides
an operational workaround.

The healthy state of FM2 enabled us to prune the
fault tree signifIcantly. This narrowed the likely
faults to a latchup or (more likely) SEU in the
receiver DSP. Upsets in the data memory could
have desensitized the receiver, or critical chip
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operation could have been disrupted. While we
were aware of this vulnerability-DSP operation
was required even for a master reset-the lack of
stored watchdog commands failed to protect us as
planned. Further thinking about the reset design
has lead to a much more robust approach for FM336.

nominally off, but is turned on by the transmitter
DSP whenever a burst is being sent to the
modulator. However, to save power, the final stage
does not use a switch; power is always available at
the collector.
With its tight power, mass, and volume constraints,
transmit-receive band separation of only 7%, and
in-band VHF backhaullinks, the electrical isolation
between antennas is critical. This applies to both
transmitter-transmtter isolation (where the filters
provide little help), and isolation between either
transmitter and either receiver. Isolation between
the subscriber transmit and gateway transmit
antennas consistently measured about 23 dB across
several flight and qualification assemblies. Most
system-level communications testing used an
antenna simulator containing attenuators to prevent
radiation and mimic the isolation on each path.
The flight and qualification spacecraft were also
tested in a large anechoic chamber for proper
transmission and isolation. None of these tests
indicated an oscillation problem.

A complete power cycle also seemed the best way
to clear the subscriber transmitter fault on FMl. A
stored command sequence was developed that
would deliberately starve the spacecraft for power
and deplete the batteries. On-orbit this proved
surprisingly difficult to do-the spacecraft is quite
effective at restoring a power balance in sunlight
and exact time of battery exhaustion is difficult to
predict. When power depletion finally coincided
with eclipse on June 13, FMl successfully passed
through Phoenix mode and reconnected with the
network automatically on the next pass. STX
telemetry had already resumed. Following the
normal recovery process, STX testing indicated no
damage.

However, testing with spare STXs and gateway
transceivers in the lab indicated that a reduction in
isolation could eventually induce oscillation during
the "off' period, but not always immediately. This
effect depended on the particular gateway
transmitter used. It also was strongly sensitive to
the exact antenna isolation-a change of about 2
dB could take the setup from normal operation to
guaranteed oscillation. This, coupled with the
sensitivity to a particular amplifier, meant that PMl
was unlikely to experience the problem. Happily,
after an initial degradation, the transistor did not
appear to be damaged further.

Again, the healthy hardware limited the number of
possible causes of the outage. Analysis indicated
that the most likely cause is a latchup in the STX
controller's PROM chip. This part has been
removed in the newer design. and additional
latchup protection features added. In addition to
improved reset procedures, the upgraded power
system on FM3-36 allows switching of the 5 and
14-volt power to each unit independently. This
allows controllers to clear a latchup immediately
without affecting overall spacecraft operation.
Improved solid-state switching and several
innovations in the wire harness design make this
approach practical within the tight ORBCOMM
mass constraints.

For FMl&2, a workaround has been developed that
involves using the minimum STX transmit power
necessary for a locally good packet downlink error
rate and switching it off when not connected to the
network. For PM3-36, the redesigned antenna
provides additional isolation and both HPA stages
are switched off between downlink bursts. For
testing, antenna simulator isolation has been set
more conservatively.

FM2 Gateway Transmitter Oscillation
In early June, routine SRX scans of PM2's receive
band showed an elevated noise floor. This slightly
worsened over a period of days.
Gateway
transmitter "off' current (measured during nontransmitting slots in the downlink TDMA protocol)
was also high. Furthermore the STX had to be on
and operating at full power to trigger the behavior
after the gateway transmitter was power-cycled.

Software Anomalies
Several software bugs were uncovered during
operations. Most were minor and easily repaired.
However
all
served to obfuscate
the
troubleshooting on the major anomalies. The two

The gateway transmitter uses a Class C high-power
amplifier final stage. Its driver stage's collector is
switched by a series transistor. This transistor is
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Initial Operations

most significant were particularly related to the onorbit operations.

With the anomalies fixed, initial operations
proceeded smoothly. A single operator could
easily handle both spacecraft; planning, analysis
and other support functions could be done on a
daily basis without shift work. Telemetry logging,
pass plan generation, orbit determination, and other
software tools worked as planned. Many passes
were declared to be "listen only" or simply not used
as a contact.

A number of units were reset by the health and
maintenance (H&M) task on the flight computer for
no obvious reason. In all cases, the units appeared
to be overdue in their responses to H&M polls.
Thinking the units hung, H&M reset them. Though
often apparently random, resets sometimes
occurred in batches. Exhaustive timeline analysis
showed a partial correlation with one of the two
types of stored telemetry dumps. Certain patterns
of ORBCOMM test traffic, the downlink TDMA
assignments, and GPS receiver resets also seemed
to have a poorly correlated effect.

Additional engineering support was used for
maneuvers and on-orbit testing. Maneuvers began
with a series of calibration firings to allow
correction of thruster misalignments. This was
simple on FMl, but the misalignment or deployed
c.g. offset was much greater on FM2.
Then
maneuver commands are loaded that fire the
thrusters at a selected point in the orbit if the
attitude is within certain constraints. Thruster
disturbances typically caused the ACS to lose suntracking and sometimes caused significant pitch
and roll excursions. (Despite the mass penalty,
FM3-36 use a three-thruster arrangement to
simplify calibration burns and ground alignment,
and reduce attitude disturbances).

The cause was flight computer processor peak
loading. Resets occurred when the H&M task failed
to listen to the returned message from a unit until
after the timeout had expired. This behavior
occurred during conditions of rapid telemetry
dumping in a particular mode. (This rate was often
above the level practical with revenue-generating
traffic present.) Resets of the GPS, which caused an
ephemeris loading operation, hogged resources.
Communications traffic had a minor but finite
effect on loading as well. System level tests,
though more stressful of individual contributors to
the loading, had not often exercised the particular
combinations now causing problems, but many
repetitions of the stressing load conditions were
required to generate a reset.. Numerous fixes were
possible, but the simplest one was to increase the
allowable timeout period. Since the peak loads
were brief, no other problems arose.

Table 2 summarizes the on-orbit testing results.
Power, ACS, and other housekeeping systems were
mostly "tested" by analysis of routine telemetry.
Communications links were exercised by a
calibrated series of uplinks and careful
measurement of downlink behavior. ORBCOMM
Global also began extensive message traffic tests
during this period.

The SRX 68302 processor also became
momentarily overloaded at times. Generally this
happened out of ground contact. The SRX and the
system had both been tested for large single and
broadband interferers thought to be representative
of the flight spectral environment. However,
certain characteristics of the actual uplink noise
environments could more heavily load the active
channel assignment task. Because these cases were
unknown before FMl&2 collected detailed spectral
data, and they are less stressful to the RF functions
and channel availability, they were not tested.

Having successfully completed the planned onorbit tests, the spacecraft were delivered to
ORBCOMM Global on August 3,1995.

Key Design Upgrades
Table 3 summarizes the most significant design
changes from FMl&2 for FM3-36 now under
construction.
Most of these changes had been
identified before launch as a result of the intense
effort to integrate and qualify FMl&2. Some also
reduce mass, enhance performance, or extend the
satellite design life to 5 years from the original
four.
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Table 2. On-orbit Testing Summary.
Subsystem
Attitude Control

Power

Flight Computer

GPS

Results
All functions verified. Better nadir pointing
30' vs 10° requirement) than expected. Yaw
1
performance about 900k efficient vs. 95% goal

Tests/Objectives
Pointing for communications
Auto. Acquisition/mode transitions
Fixed yaw for thrusting
Recovery following thrusting
Thruster control
Solar array pointing/featherina
Solar array output
Heater operation
Battery operation
Auto mode transitions
Load shedding
Phoenix mode recovery
Reset response
Eclipse transitions/management
Thermal and misc. telemetry
Real time and stored commands
Telemetry gathering
Backorbit telemetry
Health & Maintenance functions
Resets of other units
Position and time fixes

Gateway Link

Subscriber
Uplink

Subscriber
Downlink
UHF

rr.

All functions verified. Solar array output about
a W low due to excessive harness losses and
other effects.

All functions verified. Some problem with H&M
timeouts.

Downlink performance
Uplink performance
Timing synchronization
Master reset operation
Packet error rates in all modes
Mode selection
DCMS (spectrum/channel assigment
function)
EIRP
Tuning
Power Control
EIRP
Frequency and Stability

II

Good. but infrequent at times due to geometry.
UTC/GPS time error on resets until initialized.
All functions verified. Signal strengths close to
pre-launch expectations

All functions verified. Slightly high falseacquire rates. DCMS sensitivity to certain
noise patterns loads processor.
All functions verified. EIRP close to pre-launch
expectations.
Verified.

T.bI3D·
a e . eSlgn Changes itOf FM3-36.
Subsystemlltem
VHF Antennas

FM1&2
Array of quad
helixes
Double-hetlDSP
Dual 20 watt

FM3-36
Large quad helix

a-bit processor
Original design

16-bit processor, OCXO
Upgraded switching

Solar Arrays
GPS
ACS
Operating system

Silicon
Trimble TANS
g-g/magnetic
MPXlOSX

GaAs
Rockwell MPE
Vertical wheel added
VxWorks

RCS

2 thrusters

3 thrusters

Subscriber Receiver
Subscriber
Transmitter
Gateway Transceiver
BCR

Direct conversion DSP
Single 40 watt, OCXO

However, two additional key design upgrades
resulted from the on-orbit experience. The first of
these is a greatly improved reset/watchdog strategy.
The reset approach uses four distinct levels of
monitoring to recover portions of the spacecraft' s

Reason
Performance, Simplicity, requirements
relief
Mass, volume, performance
Simpler antennas, better stability
Better software distribution, stability
Better SEL protection, operational
flexibility
Power, extra life
Size. mass, power performance
Improved yaw performance
improved development support.
reliability
Relaxed alianment, longer burns

avionics function. These levels start from unit
internal software self-monitoring and hardware
watchdog and progresss to a means for cycling
power to the entire spacecraft. A function similar
to FM1&2's commanded reset is retained, but
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woven into the more-comprehensive strategy. The
design explicitly incorporates well-analyzed
features at several of the levels to deal with singleevent effects, which are difficult to test at the
system level. The improved reset strategy has
forced a straightforward but significant design
change to most unit designs.

Only anomalies that threaten further damage to the
spacecraft need immediate attention. Otherwise,
Kepler and Newton guarantee both the spacecraft
and the sun will pass overhead tomorrow.
Disconnect the troubleshooting and analysis from
the operations and pass-taking as much as possible;
engineering isn't done best as shift work by those
not used to it. An exhausted team is easily
confused by the many false leads. Everyone from
top management to the pizza delivery boy should
assume that resolution will take many days or
weeks, and plan their work, rest, briefing
requirements, support needs, and attitudes
accordingly. Prioritize problems and assign a
unique troubleshooting team to each one. Finally,
don't give up--spacecraft are recovered after long
outages.

Improved piece-part choices, testing, and
protection represent another general upgrade for
the new spacecraft. ORBCOMM could not be built
without using the latest DSPs, analog-to-digital
converters, FPGAs, and other modern (frequently
CMOS) parts. These parts often are newer than
anyone's "approved" list. A major effort was made
to substitute parts which have inherently better
radiation characteristics, or for which data was
available.
A substantial test program has
characterized dozens of parts for total dose and
single-event effects where this was not possible. In
addition, the commercial part screening program
used on FMl&2 has been enhanced. Finally, the
unit designs have improved protection against
damage from SEL current in critical parts.

Reference
1Stoltz, Paul M., Krebs, Mark R., and Baltman,
Richard, ORBCOMM Attitude Determination and
Control, AIAA 96-3620.

Conclusions
ORBCOMM FMl&2 overcame initial operational
difficulties and have now operated successfully for
over a year. The all-new spacecraft successfully
demonstrated highly autonomous acquisition, bus
system performance, and simple operations.
Performance of the complex communications
system has matched that anticipated at launch.
Minor effects of the orbit and operational
environment caused major anomalies. Critical
conditions may be hard to foresee or simulate in
test, but a good reset strategy can cure a lot of ills.
The reset/watchdog strategy should be simple,
comprehensive, and rmnUIDze disruption of
revenue-producing services. Special attention is
warranted for exceptions, such as non-conforming
units (how is the watcher watched?), unusual
modes (launch), or less-protected systems (gateway
receive DSP). Modern parts will experience SEUs,
and upsets will not wait until operations are ready
for them.
Operations planning must assume that anomalies
will occur during initial operation of any complex
new spacecraft. Some portion of the engineering
team should not be exhausted following launch.
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